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Policy recommendations
security and labour rights are still not guaranteed for 
the majority of Syrian work permit holders. Agencies 
that support the implementation of the EU–Jordan 
Compact should insist on employers’ compliance with 
labour rights and ILO standards of decent work for 
work permit holders and assist in implementing them.
\ Encourage Jordanian–Syrian businesses 
and home-based businesses of Syrian 
refugees
Establishing a business can alleviate tensions in the 
Jordanian labour market. The government of Jordan 
should relax the administrative barriers for Jordanian–
Syrian joint ventures and abrogate restrictions for Syri-
ans in access to finance. Small-scale home-based busi-
nesses for refugees should also be permitted.
\ Involve Syrian refugees and Jordanian 
employers in adjusting the EU–Jordan 
Compact
To avoid failures in reaching the targets of the EU–Jordan 
Compact, Syrian refugees and Jordanian employers need 
to be included in revising the Compact. UNHCR could 
support the establishment of a representative refugee 
council, which should have an advisory role during the 
negotiations about the contents of the Compact in the 
mid-term review scheduled for 2020. 
\ Extend the sectors eligible for prefer-
ential access to the European Common 
Market 
The EU has committed itself to relaxing its trade re-
gime towards Jordan as an incentive to promote the 
employment of Syrian refugees staying in the country. 
However, the current limitation to garment, plastic 
and metal industries in designated special economic 
zones does not match the skills Syrians have. There-
fore, the EU–Jordan Compact should be opened up to 
further sectors, such as agro-industries.
\ Retain the waiver of work permit fees 
for refugees as a contribution to burden- 
sharing
The government of Jordan has waived work permit 
fees for Syrian refugees since April 2016 and has now 
stretched the grace period until the end of 2019. To 
make the planning for employees and job seekers relia-
ble, the ILO and UNHCR should ensure that the waiver 
remains in place until Syrians can return home. Trans-
parency about the future cost of work permits and 
early information before fees for work permits for Syri-
ans are re-introduced are also necessary. 
\ Make work permits an entry point for 
decent work
Work permits for Syrians are an entry point for refu-
gees in formal labour relations. However, social 
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The EU-Jordan Compact links support for the govern-
ment of Jordan as the host country of more than 
670,000 registered Syrian refugees (in 2018) with eco-
nomic cooperation and trade liberalisation to satisfy 
the interests of the government of Jordan and the  
European Union (EU). Established in 2016, the Compact 
aims to integrate Syrian refugees in the Jordanian 
labour market. Jordanian companies producing export 
commodities in 18 designated economic zones will 
benefit from the EU preferential trade regime if they 
fill 15 per cent of their job positions with Syrian refu-
gees until 2018 and 25 per cent after that. The EU–Jordan 
Compact intends to reach the target of 200,000 formal 
job opportunities for Syrian refugees holding work 
permits without taking jobs away from Jordanians. 
When this is achieved, producers in Jordan even be-
yond the designated zones are eligible to benefit from 
a relaxation of the EU rules of origin regime for ten 
years. The Jordanian government is interested in the 
Compact as this will enhance the Jordanian export 
sector and combat high unemployment (18 per cent  
in 2018). From the perspective of the Jordanian gov-
ernment, the Compact may have the effect of 
(t)urning the Syrian refugee crisis into a development 
opportunity that attracts new investments and 
opens up the EU market with simplified rules of ori-
gin, creating jobs for Jordanians and Syrian refugees 
whilst supporting the post-conflict Syrian economy 
(Government of Jordan, 2016).
The EU is interested in the Compact as it makes stay-
ing in Jordan attractive for Syrian refugees and keeps 
the option of return to Syria open, thus offering an  
alternative to onward migration to Europe.
The inventors of the EU–Jordan Compact are the re-
nowned economists Alexander Betts and Paul Collier, 
who propagate making refugees “agents of develop-
ment” (Betts & Collier, 2017) suggesting a firm policy 
towards labour market integration of Syrian refugees 
in Jordan. The intended effect is to avert the aid de-
pendency syndrome from Syrians living in protracted 
displacement in Jordan and avoid market inefficiencies 
following the exclusion of refugees and their skills 
from the labour market. The Compact thus addresses 
the problem that there are hardly any viable 
solutions for protracted refugee situations 1 affecting 
about two-thirds of refugees worldwide. If successful, 
the EU–Jordan Compact may become a model for  
further compacts between the European Union and 
countries that host refugees in protracted displace-
ment. However, three years into the Compact, neither 
the targeted employment of refugees nor the inclu-
sion of a significant number of Jordanian companies 
in the preferential trade agreement that forms the 
core of the Compact has been achieved. 
There are economic, social and political reasons for 
the low performance of the Compact as well as mis-
conceptions about the role refugees in protracted dis-
placement situations can play. Based on field research 
and secondary literature, this Policy Brief sheds light 
on some of these reasons. 2 It argues for adjustments 
to the ‘compact approach’, bringing it in line with the 
request for sharing the burden and responsibility in 
refugee crises as suggested in the Global Compact on 
Refugees between countries of the Global North and 
South. 3 By taking the recommendations of this Policy 
Brief on—which addresses the negotiators of the  
review of the EU–Jordan Compact as well as the fund-
ing agencies that will be involved in the review process 
in 2020—refugees in protracted displacement may  
become an integral and equal part of burden-sharing 
rather than being considered merely as a burden  
others have to shoulder (as stipulated by the Refugee 
Compact). The Policy Brief also makes suggestions that 
can develop the ‘compact approach’ further.
1 \ Protracted displacement refers to refugees staying abroad 
in large numbers for more than five years.
2 \ The author collected perceptions of Syrian refugees in 
Greater Amman in late 2016 and 2017 (Grawert, 2019).
3 \ The member states of the UN General Assembly affirmed 
the Global Compact on Refugees on 17 December 2018 in the 
annual resolution on the work of UNHCR. The Global Compact 
“aims to strengthen the international response to large move-
ments of refugees and protracted refugee situations. Its four 
key objectives are to (e)ase the pressures on host countries,  
(e)nhance refugee self-reliance, (e)xpand access to third-coun-
try solutions (and)(s)upport conditions in countries of origin 
for return in safety and dignity” (UNHCR, 2018).
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The core of the Compact:  
Easier access to the European market 
and aid in return for the employment 
of Syrian refugees 
Export-oriented Jordanian companies—mostly light 
industries and services (mainly tourism)—operate in 
clusters located in special economic zones that offer 
reduced tax rates and low import duties to attract 
international investors. Bilateral trade agreements  
facilitate exports from these free trade zones. The  
Jordanian Association Agreement with the European 
Union, entered into in 2002, stipulates that for exports 
to the European market, an average of 60 per cent of 
the export value of a product has to be from Jordanian 
origin. What is new about the EU–Jordan Compact is 
that it relaxes the rules of origin further so that prod-
ucts destined for the European market need to contain 
only 30 per cent on average from Jordanian origin. 
However, only selected industrial items are included 
in the new trade regime, listed in 52 (out of 97) chap-
ters of the Harmonised System Code by which the 
World Customs Organisation classifies traded goods. 
Hence, the Compact limits the export commodities 
that are included in the preferential trade regime to 
specific light industries, predominantly garment fac-
tories. Companies processing agrarian products, one 
of the predominant sectors in the Jordanian economy, 
are not included in the regime (Arroyo, 2018). 
Complementary to the preferential trade regime, Jor-
dan receives generous assistance from the European 
Union—over two billion US dollars in 2016 to 2018 
(EEAS, 2018). Development agencies, among them the 
German Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammen- 
arbeit (GIZ) and the United States Agency for Interna-
tional Development (USAID) provide vocational train-
ing for refugees, and the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) and the EU support additional 
employment services.
The duration of the preferential trade regime was ini-
tially fixed at ten years; during a meeting in December 
2018, the EU High Representative Federica Mogherini 
and King Abdullah II of the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan agreed to prolong it to 2030 and further relax 
the criteria for companies operating in Jordan to  
become eligible for the preferential trade regime. 
Extend the sectors eligible for prefer-
ential access to the European Common 
Market of Jordanian firms that employ 
refugees 
Until 2017, Jordan's exports to the European Union 
grew by 5.3 per cent, reaching EUR 357 million. An EU 
delegation stated that “sectors that grew the most, 
presenting an export potential, are covered by the 
agreement, such as chemicals, textile and manufac-
turing" (Ghazal, 2018). However, so far only four com-
panies have qualified for the relaxed rules of origin; 
their export value was only EUR 1.9 million in 2017, 
and they employed less than 300 Syrian refugees. 
There are three economic reasons for the sobering 
performance of the Compact: 
1\ The preferential trade regime covers sectors 
where other Mediterranean countries have com-
parative advantages and excludes about two-
thirds of Jordanian exports accruing from other 
commodities (Maltz & Huang, 2018). 
2\ Many factories in Asian countries have lower  
production costs for textiles than Jordanian fac-
tories, benefitting also from preferential market 
access to Europe, and have long-established mar-
keting networks—which Jordanian companies do 
not have. 
3\ Jordanian manufacturers are mostly oriented to-
wards the regional markets and do not necessarily 
see a benefit in increasing their standards to be 
eligible for the European market (Lenner & Turner, 
2018).
The main economic reason for the low inclusion of 
Jordanian companies in the preferential trade regime 
is thus lack of competitiveness with regard to the en-
visaged products. Syrian refugees also have economic 
reasons why they do not apply for work permits for 
factory work in significant numbers. Like any other 
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have to be extended to Jordanian companies emplo-
ying Syrian refugees (as well as Jordanians) outside 
the 18 designated zones. Moreover, Jordanian–Syrian 
joint ventures employing both Jordanians and Syrian 
refugees should be included, allowing the Jordanian 
economy to benefit from synergies of Syrian and Jor-
danian business cooperation in those sectors where 
they have comparative advantages—including food 
processing. 
Retain the waiver of work permit fees 
for refugees as a contribution to  
burden-sharing
Work permits are the means to bring the non-Jorda-
nian labour force into the formal labour market. 
Hence, the Jordanian Ministry of Labour issues work 
permits for all the specified jobs that are open to 
non-Jordanians—not only in the special economic 
zones but also in other sectors. Employers are expected 
to pay for the work permit and health insurance for 
the worker. The work permit has to be renewed annu-
ally or whenever a worker changes their employer. 
To make employment of Syrian refugees in jobs open 
for non-Jordanians more attractive for employers and 
Syrian jobseekers, the Jordanian government intro-
duced a waiver for work permit fees for Syrians in 
April 2016 and extended that waiver for periods of 
three months ever after. In December 2018, it extend-
ed the grace period for a full year until the end of 2019 
(Government of Jordan et al., 2018). This has been a 
useful decision that will relieve employers from the 
previous uncertainty about the future of the cost for 
work permits. 
Agriculture and construction are the sectors where 
most of the non-Jordanian workers are employed, often 
seasonally and with frequent changes of employers.  
To make the inclusion of Syrian refugees in the labour 
force attractive beyond the factories included in the 
EU–Jordan Compact, the ILO successfully convinced 
the Jordanian government to issue work permits that 
are not linked to one job or employer in construction 
job seekers, they prefer taking jobs in the informal 
markets prevailing in the Jordanian economy. This 
matches Jordanian employers’ interest in skilled  
Syrians working informally in jobs that officially are 
closed to non-Jordanians because they can pay equally 
skilled refugees less than Jordanians. Hence, Syrian 
refugees take the opportunities of informal employ-
ment, negotiate the wages or salaries with Jordanian 
employers, do not pay insurances and change jobs  
easily when they are not satisfied with the conditions 
(Grawert, 2019).
There are also several social reasons why Syrian refu-
gees are reluctant to work in the designated econo-
mic zones. Syrian men are rarely prepared to stay in 
dormitories on site, far from their families, whereas 
Arab and Asian migrant factory workers’ families are 
not in Jordan. In consequence, they do not mind stay-
ing on site and working overtime. Moreover, many  
Syrians who have had skilled employment in Syria 
before decline to become factory workers. Syrian  
women, in addition to the above economic reasons, 
prefer working in small-scale home businesses close 
to their families, thus avoiding being harassed on the 
way to work (Grawert, 2019). 
The main political reason for the low performance of 
the Compact is the ambition of the Jordanian govern-
ment to prevent Syrian refugees from competing 
with the Jordanian labour force. The limitation to the 
18 designated zones guarantees that Syrian refugees 
compete with migrant workers, not Jordanians. The 
government insists that Syrians can only receive 
work permits if the companies in the designated  
zones employ already 30 per cent Jordanians before 
they hire 15 per cent Syrians. However, Jordanians 
hardly accept the low wages and adverse working 
conditions prevailing in these factories so that com-
panies often fail to find 30 per cent Jordanian workers 
(Arroyo, 2018).  
The amendments of the EU–Jordan Compact in 2018 
only superficially touch on the problems underlying 
its low performance. If the preferential trade regime 
is to have the effect of real burden sharing, it will 
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Make work permits an entry point for 
decent work 
While work permits for Syrian refugees are an entry 
point in labour relations in the formal economy, so-
cial security (such as health insurance) and labour 
rights (annual leave, sick leave) are still not guaran-
teed for the majority of Syrian work permit holders, 
and working conditions in the factories of the special 
economic zones are poor. In interviews, several refu-
gees explained that they were not ready to work for 
the low wages (about US $280 per month) offered in 
the designated zones and to pay high transport fees 
to reach the factories. Family heads complained that 
the low wages were by far not sufficient to cover fami-
lies’ basic needs. Overtime is rarely paid. An ILO  
survey revealed that only 20 per cent of the Syrian 
employees with work permits are covered by social 
security even though it is required by Jordanian  
labour law (ILO, 2017). Lenner & Turner (2018) criticise 
that the ILO has withdrawn its strong initial engage-
ment for decent work conditions in the framework of 
the EU–Jordan Compact and, instead has become 
fixed on the aim of increasing the number of work 
permits obtained by Syrian refugees by all means. The 
Compact thus may promote working conditions for 
Syrians that are far from the ILO standards of decent 
work.
The ILO, UNHCR and other international agencies 
such as GIZ that support the implementation of the 
EU–Jordan Compact should insist that employers 
comply with labour rights and the ILO standards of 
decent work for work permit holders and assist in im-
plementing them. ILO’s ‘Better Work Jordan pro-
gramme’ (ILO, 2019), where the ILO cooperates with 
the Jordanian Ministry of Labour in monitoring work 
conditions through labour inspectors, is a step in the 
right direction.
and agriculture. Until 2018, the ILO together with Jor-
danian trade unions succeeded in establishing 22 agri-
cultural cooperatives (alliances of agricultural em-
ployers) and gained 6,300 employers in construction 
who accept Syrian refugees keeping the same work 
permit when changing the employer. However, job  
opportunities in construction and agriculture are not 
attractive to Syrian refugees with professional skills. 
These skills are prominently in education, medicine 
and business management, areas that belong to the 
sectors that are closed to non-Jordanians. Besides this, 
Egyptian and other migrants are side-lined because 
Syrians benefit from the work permit waiver and com-
pete in the same sector, whereas other migrants that 
prevail in the construction sector and broker workers 
to employers have to pay for work permits (Lenner & 
Turner, 2018). Hence, the preferential access for Syrian 
refugees to construction work may create conflicts 
with established migrant workers’ hiring systems and 
cause new problems. 
Whereas in December 2015, only 4,000 Syrians had 
obtained a work permit, until late 2018, the number of 
Syrians with a work permit had allegedly increased to 
120,000 in those fields of employment permitted for 
non-Jordanians; five per cent were women (UNHCR, 
2019). However, a study by the International Rescue 
Committee (IRC, 2018) points out that many of the 
work permits are re-issued permits and not new ones. 
The combination of the above factors explains why 
Syrians in Jordan still hesitate to obtain and renew a 
work permit. 
Removing the uncertainties about the duration of the 
waiver for work permit fees for Syrian refugees is a 
first step towards making it possible that employers 
and employees can properly calculate expenditures—
if they consider joining the formal labour market of 
Jordan. International agencies should support the 
waiver until Syrian refugees can return home as a fur-
ther way of engagement in sharing Jordan’s burden as 
a host community for Syrian refugees. Once Syrians 
start to return in large numbers, the government of 
Jordan should be transparent about the future cost of 
work permits and provide early information before 
fees for work permits for Syrians will be re-introduced. 
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Encourage Jordanian–Syrian businesses 
and home-based businesses of Syrian 
refugees
Potential entrepreneurs among the refugees face 
high bureaucratic hurdles and are denied access to 
financial services. Some Syrians have funds they can 
invest if regulations are relaxed (author’s interview 
with Syrian businessmen in Ain al-Basha, January 
2017). The rigid rules prevent Syrian refugees who 
could set up businesses from taking the opportunity 
to create employment also for Jordanians. In contrast 
to employment restrictions to foreigners meant to 
protect skilled Jordanians from losing their jobs,  
establishing businesses can contribute to easing the 
tensions on the labour market. Moreover, Jordanian–
Syrian joint ventures could establish branches in Syr-
ia as soon as investment becomes possible there. 
Hence, the parties engaged in the review of the EU–
Jordan Compact should seek solutions that enable 
the start-up of Jordanian–Syrian businesses.
Many Syrian refugees, and women in particular, used 
to run home-based small businesses for catering, 
hairdressing and other services. In October 2017, the 
Jordanian government regulated home-based busi-
nesses in Jordan in an attempt to include this sector 
in the formal economy. The government amended 
this regulation in November 2018, allowing registered 
home-based businesses in food-processing, handi-
crafts and tailoring to operate, “provided that the  
percentage of Jordanians benefiting from the support 
given to these works is not less than 70%” (Government 
of Jordan, 2018). The outcome of the regulation has 
been that home-based businesses are criminalised, 
can be shut down and their owners fined at any time. 
In consequence, refugees engaged in such a home 
business may be relocated to a refugee camp. Hence, 
this effort to regulate the large shadow economy in 
Jordan has adverse effects on the livelihood of Syrian 
refugee families. Many of them depend on women’s 
small home businesses irrespective of the number of 
Jordanians working in the same sector. The regula-
tion—even after the amendment—is likely to 
increase families’ need for aid, thus contradicting 
measures of opening livelihood options for Syrian 
refugees that make them resilient. The argument by 
the government that the regulation should prevent 
competition with Jordanians does not hold in this 
case as the customers of Syrian refugee women’s 
home businesses are mainly other Syrian women; 
hence, they do not interfere in the markets of Jorda-
nians (Grawert, 2019). Therefore, the ILO and UNHCR 
should urge the Jordanian government to relax the 
regulation for refugees.
Involve Syrian refugees and Jordanian 
employers in adjusting the EU–Jordan 
refugee compact
The mid-term review planned for 2020 should con-
sider the Compact’s potential in providing additional 
livelihood options for refugees from Syria, but also 
adjust the decision-making process. Clarity about 
the available potential labour force among the refu-
gees is a fundamental precondition for the review. 
Statistical data suggest that nearly 300,000 registered 
Syrian refugees (out of more than 670,000) are adults 
of working age. Families or parts of families form the 
bulk of the Syrian refugees in Jordan. This differs 
from the migrant workers from Arab and Asian 
countries in Jordan, who are mostly single men who 
send remittances to their families abroad. Among 
the unregistered refugees, too, there are many partial 
families, mostly widows or single women with chil-
dren. Different from labour migrants, a high number 
of Syrian refugees are affected by injuries and 
illnesses or are disabled. According to the UNHCR,  
55 per cent of the Syrian refugees were vulnerable 
with regard to health in 2017. Trauma and illnesses 
affect many refugees as consequences of war experi-
ences such as the killing of relatives, separation from 
family members, destruction of homes and incidences 
of violence during their displacement (Grawert, 
2019). Many will need support for a long time and  
are unable to enter regular employment. Hence, the 
employment aim of 200,000 Syrian refugees fixed in 
EU–Jordan Compact is overly ambitious. 
THE EU–JORDAN COMPACT: A MODEL FOR BURDEN-SHARING IN REFUGEE CRISES?  \ M. GRAWERT
7 \ \ POLICY BRIEF 3 \ 2019
To avoid future misconceptions about the potential to 
include refugees in the labour market, Jordanian em-
ployers and Syrian refugees should be involved in the 
review process of the EU–Jordan Compact. With the 
help of the UNHCR, the registered Syrian refugees 
ought to be involved in an assessment of their capa-
bilities in accessing the formal labour market. The 
UNHCR could support the establishment of a repre-
sentative refugee council which should proportional-
ly include men, women and different age groups 
based on the UNHCR statistics of registered refugees. 
Council elections should be convened regularly to  
reflect changes in the composition of the refugee 
groups. The council could represent refugees’ inter-
ests towards the humanitarian agencies in general 
and, together with Jordanian employers, take on an 
advisory role during the negotiations about the con-
tents of the Compact during the review process in 
2020.
Such an inclusive approach may contribute to over-
coming the problems of the EU–Jordan Compact so 
that it can become a model for burden-sharing that 
can also be used in other refugee crises.
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